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Abstract
Reputation is crucial to enabling human or software agents to select among al-
ternative providers. Although several e↵ective reputation assessment methods
exist, they typically distil reputation into a numerical representation, with no
accompanying explanation of the rationale behind the assessment. Such expla-
nations would allow users or clients to make a richer assessment of providers,
and tailor selection according to their preferences and current context. In this
paper, we propose an approach to explain the rationale behind assessments from
quantitative reputation models, by generating arguments that are combined to
form explanations. Our approach adapts, extends and combines existing ap-
proaches for explaining decisions made using multi-attribute decision models
in the context of reputation. We present example argument templates, and
describe how to select their parameters using explanation algorithms. Our pro-
posal was evaluated by means of a user study, which followed an existing proto-
col. Our results give evidence that although explanations present a subset of the
information of trust scores, they are su cient to equally evaluate providers rec-
ommended based on their trust score. Moreover, when explanation arguments
reveal implicit model information, they are less persuasive than scores.
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1. Introduction
In environments where many parties o↵er comparable services or products,
customers need to be able to choose between the options available. Automated
support for this has been studied extensively in the areas of recommender sys-
tems [1] and reputation assessment [2]. In particular, reputation assessment al-5
lows the calculation of reputation scores so that the past performance of service
providers can be compared. These scores can then be used to determine which
provider to select, as they characterise providers according to the factors of in-
terest to the client. Various reputation models [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] have been shown to
be e↵ective through empirical evaluation, but do not provide the transparency10
needed to understand why one provider has a better reputation than another.
As the complexity of reputation models increases, this understanding is becom-
ing harder to achieve. Access to the reasons that underlie reputation assessment
would allow users to judge whether the resulting reputation scores reflect their
actual interests in the current context, and allow providers to identify the as-15
pects they must improve. Explanations have been exploited to improve user
system acceptance in expert systems and recommender systems [8], but have
not been explored in the context where automated interactions occur, such as
in multi-agent systems, or instantiated for reputation assessment methods.
Our goal is to improve, from the user perspective, the transparency of repu-20
tation models, which are in general purely quantitative. Reputation scores are
helpful to assess and rank providers but, with explanations of such scores, users
would be able to evaluate whether they agree with them. As a consequence,
users can make more e↵ective choices when taking reputation into account. We
propose an approach to explain the rationale behind the scores generated by25
reputation assessment models. These are abstracted into a generic reputation
model, which we refer to as the multi-term reputation model (MTRM). This is
not a new reputation model, but rather is a generalised model in which we can
2
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express existing reputation assessment methods, upon which explanations can
be built. Our approach generates arguments about the reasons behind repu-30
tation scores by leveraging explanation approaches proposed in the context of
multi-attribute utility theory [9, 10], and combines the arguments into expla-
nations. Explanations are produced based on information that can be obtained
from an instance of MTRM. Moreover, this generic reputation model can be
customised, leading to an instantiation of a specific underlying existing reputa-35
tion model, and model-specific arguments can then be generated. In order to
illustrate this process, we show customisations for the FIRE [4] and TRAVOS [5]
reputation models.
Despite the fact that users have generally been taken out of the loop in
evaluations of work on trust and reputation for multi-agent systems, a study40
involving real people is essential for validating our approach. Therefore, in or-
der to evaluate our generated explanations, we conducted a user study, which
provides evidence of their usefulness. The study involve 30 participants and fol-
lowed the protocol proposed by Bilgic and Mooney [11]. As result, we observed
that, in order to assess providers, our explanations is as e cient as having de-45
tailed information about trust scores of providers, that is, with less information
(and possibly more confidentially) participants were able to assess providers.
Furthermore, our explanation arguments are less persuasive than scores when
they reveal implicit model information. In our study, arguments were presented
to participants in a textual form, generated using example templates of how50
to transform our explanation arguments into a user-understandable form. This
choice caused participants, however, to prefer trust scores, which were presented
in a table, over textual explanations.
In summary, our key contribution is an approach to explain quantitative
reputation models, focusing on FIRE and TRAVOS as illustrative reputation55
models. Specifically, we (i) propose a method to generate explanations of assess-
ments from quantitative reputation models, (ii) show how to leverage existing
approaches for explaining decisions made using multi-attribute decision models
in the context of reputation, and (iii) evaluate such explanations through a user
3
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study.60
We describe background research and related work in Section 2. The multi-
term reputation model (MTRM) is introduced in Section 3, followed by a de-
scription of our explanation approach in Section 4. The user study performed
to evaluate our approach is presented in Section 5. Finally, we present our
conclusions in Section 6.65
2. Background and Related Work
Two main research areas are associated with our work, namely, explana-
tions for recommender and decision support systems, and trust and reputation
assessment methods. There is much work that has been done in the former,
but not addressing our particular context. We give an overview of explanation70
approaches and introduce those that are adopted in our work in Section 2.1.
Trust and reputation have also been widely investigated and, as a result, many
reputation models have been proposed. Our approach aims to be generic, in the
sense that it can be used with any reputation model. We instantiate it for il-
lustration using two existing reputation models, FIRE [4] and TRAVOS [5, 12],75
as described in Section 2.2.
2.1. Explanation Generation
Over recent years, there has been an increasing interest in explanations for
recommender and decision support systems [8, 13, 14]. Explanations in such
systems have been investigated, as was the case with expert systems [15], be-80
cause explanations can promote many benefits, including increased user trust
and more e↵ective decisions [8], which are fundamental to user acceptance of
these systems.
Di↵erent studies have been performed in the context of explanations. Many
types of explanations given for recommender systems were compared in user85
studies [13, 16]. Herlocker et al. [13] concluded that showing rates from neigh-
bours in the context of collaborative filtering (using histograms) contributes
4
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to the acceptance of the recommendation. However, Bilgic and Mooney [11]
observed that this kind of explanation persuades users to accept recommenda-
tions rather than helping them to make better choices. Indeed, explanations90
can be given with di↵erent purposes [8]. As Bilgic and Mooney argue, persua-
sion explanations cause users to overestimate the quality of an option and make
inaccurate choices and, consequently, their confidence in the system rapidly de-
teriorates. Our interest is thus in e↵ective explanations [8], which assist users
to make better decisions by helping them to evaluate the quality of options ac-95
cording to their own preferences. There are some studies with people that give
foundation to this kind of explanation [17, 18], with the proposal of patterns
and guidelines, which state that attributes presented in explanations must be
tailored to the user, as has been confirmed by a previous user study [19].
There are three main approaches that propose algorithms that select at-100
tributes to be part of e↵ective explanations [20, 9, 10]. Such approaches use
multi-attribute decision models as input, which makes them inadequate to be
used as is with reputation models. However, they can be used in a complemen-
tary way in our work, by being adapted to be used in our context.
The oldest approach, proposed by Klein and Shortli↵e [20], is empirically105
motivated but lacks proper evaluation, while Labreuche’s approach [9] addresses
a limitation of this method—a formal justification of the selected arguments.
Labreuche [9] proposed an approach for selecting and generating arguments for
the family of multi-attribute decision models parameterised by weights assigned
to the criteria, such as the expected utility model and the weighted majority110
model. The explanations generated are of four di↵erent types, generated using
di↵erent kinds of argumentation reasoning, called anchors (all, not on average,
invert and remaining case). Anchors identify changes in a weight vector v that
yields an inversion of the prescription made by the decision model, leading to
why one option is preferred to another. Two strategies for the modification of115
the weights are considered: (i) the replacement of v by some reference weights
wF , indicating that an option is preferred to another because it is better for the
most important attributes, but not on average, and (ii) a permutation of the
5
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weights v among the criteria (associated with a branch-and-bound algorithm),
indicating that the preferred option is better for the most important attributes120
and worse for the least important attributes. A trivial anchor addresses the
case of domination (the case where an option has at least one advantage with
respect to another, and no disadvantage), and another last anchor covers the
remaining cases.
An explanation generation technique was proposed by Nunes et al. [10],125
which is founded on a study of how people justify choices [18]. The technique
is composed of a set of algorithms that select attributes to be used as part
of explanations that follow di↵erent explanation patterns, such as critical at-
tribute, cut-o↵ value, decisive criteria and trade-o↵ resolution. While Klein and
Shortli↵e’s approach selects outlier attributes and Labreuche analyses weight130
changes, Nunes et al. consider a set of attributes as decisive when they are the
minimum set of attributes (in the sense of ⇢) needed to make an option worse
than another. If this set consists of all cons of an option, then a second set of
attributes is selected: the minimum set of attributes that are pros that must
not be taken into account to enable the existence of a decisive criteria.135
We have used adapted parts of these two introduced approaches [9, 10] in
the work described in this paper, and further details of these parts are provided
when we describe our explanation approach.
Argumentation frameworks have also been adopted for the purpose of em-
powering quantitative decision tools with inference mechanisms and respec-140
tive explanation capabilities—e.g. argumentation-enriched recommender sys-
tems have been proposed for recommending music [21], movies [22, 23], web
content [24], and learning objects [25]. In many such approaches, Defeasi-
ble Logic Programming (DeLP) [26] is employed either instead, or on top of
an existing quantitative technique in order to provide a qualitative perspec-145
tive, where conclusions/suggestions are reasoned in terms of arguments for and
against them. In particular, DeLP models (potentially inconsistent and contra-
dictory) knowledge about the domain, in terms of facts and a set of strict and
defeasible inference rules. An argument for a particular conclusion/suggestion
6
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
is then derived by applying backward chaining on these facts and rules. Ar-150
guments can be attacked by other arguments (e.g. those proposing opposite
conclusions), and the attacks among arguments can be resolved via associating
arguments with probabilities/preferences.
The knowledge (facts and rules) upon which the reasoning of such argumen-
tation frameworks is based is typically pre-determined, and is derived directly155
from user preference declarations, and added on top of the (sub-)results of the
quantitative measure. Our explanation approach focuses on providing a finer-
grained analysis of the reasoning behind the quantitative measure (rather than
substituting it or building on top of it), and can be seen as a dynamic generator
of knowledge to then be used by such argumentation frameworks.160
2.2. Reputation Models
Trust and reputation enable agents to minimise the inherent uncertainty
when self-interested individuals or organisations interact [27]. Trust can be
viewed as an assessment of the likelihood that an individual or organisation will
fulfil its commitments [28]. Reputation complements trust, and can be seen as165
a public perception of trustworthiness [29]. Several computational models of
trust and reputation exist, which can be broadly categorised into those that
are based on credentials and those based on experience and observation of past
behaviour—see [27, 29, 2, 30] for comprehensive reviews. Credential-based ap-
proaches use policies to express when, for what, and how to determine trust170
based on certificates, keys, or digital signatures, etc. Although such methods
are e↵ective for managing access rights and permissions, they do not support
more general reasoning about interactions, and therefore in this paper we focus
instead on experience based approaches.
Several experience based approaches use a combination of direct and indirect175
experience to derive a numerical or probabilistic assessment of reputation [31].
ReGreT [32, 3] assesses reputation on three aspects: (i) an individual dimen-
sion from direct experience, (ii) a social dimension using knowledge of others’
experiences and the social structure, and (iii) an ontological dimension that
7
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accounts for the di↵erent aspects that inform reputation (e.g. delivery, price,180
and quality). FIRE [4] builds on ReGreT through the addition of role-based
trust, and certified reputation based on third-party references [4]. TRAVOS [5]
takes a probabilistic approach to assessing trust, estimating the expected value
of success of future interactions using a beta probability distribution.
The use of a binary variable (success or failure) to model outcomes is a185
limitation of TRAVOS and alternative approaches have been proposed. For
example, BLADE [6] models agents and advisor evaluation functions as dynamic
random variables using Dirichlet distributions, enabling progressive learning of
probabilistic models through Bayesian techniques. To cope with noisy advisors,
HABIT [7] creates a Bayesian network to support reasoning about reputation.190
However, HABIT assumes that the distribution of an agent’s behaviour is static,
an assumption not made by other approaches. Other reputation systems apply
machine learning in assessing reputation, typically in assessing stereotypical
reputation [33, 34].
Although these methods rely on di↵erent aggregations/distributions, they195
have been used for the same purpose of estimating the reputation of agents
with which an agent wants to interact, relying on evaluations made based on
previous interactions (either by direct experience or with peers) over time. In
this paper, we adopt FIRE and TRAVOS as examples to illustrate our approach,
and describe their operation in more detail below. We focus on FIRE and200
TRAVOS due to their simplicity and low computational overheads, compared
to approaches such as BLADE and HABIT, because the focus of this paper
is on explanation generation providing a rationale for reputation assessment,
rather than on any particular reputation assessment method itself. We selected
two methods to demonstrate the generality of our approach and the value of205
customisations made to particular methods.
2.3. The FIRE Reputation Model
FIRE combines four types of reputation and trust: interaction trust from di-
rect experience (I), witness reputation from third party reports (W ), role-based
8
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trust (R), and certified reputation based on third-party references (Cr) [4]. Rep-210
utation is assessed in FIRE from rating tuples, (a, b, t, i, v), where a and b are
agents that participated in interaction i such that a gave b a rating value of
v 2 [ 1,+1] for the term t (e.g. reliability, quality, timeliness). A rating of
+1 is absolutely positive,  1 is absolutely negative, and 0 is neutral. In FIRE,
each agent has a history of size H and stores the last H ratings it has given in215
its local database. FIRE gives more weight to recent interactions using a rating
weight function, !K , for each trust or reputation component K 2 {I,W,R,Cr}.
The component trust or reputation a has in b for term t is the weighted
mean of ratings,
TK(a, b, t) =
P
ri2RK(a,b,t) !K(ri) · viP
ri2RK(a,b,t) !K(ri)
(1)
where RK(a, b, t) is the set of ratings stored by a regarding b for component
K with respect to term t, and vi is the value of rating ri. Interaction trust,
TI(a, b, t) is calculated from the interaction records that the assessing agent a
has in their database, RI(a, b, t). Specifically, the ratings of records matching
(a, b, t, , ) are aggregated using Equation 1, where b is the agent being assessed,
t is the term of interest, and “ ” matches any value, and:
!I(ri) = e
  ⌧(ri)  (2)
Here, !I(ri) is the weight for rating ri and  ⌧(ri) is the time since rating ri
was recorded.
Witness and certified reputation are similarly calculated, using this aggre-220
gation over di↵erent sets of interaction ratings. For witness reputation the
assessing agent, a, uses a acquaintances to provide their ratings of b for term
t, i.e. ratings of the form ( , b, t, , ). If the acquaintance has no relevant ex-
perience, they will pass on the request to their own acquaintances. To assess
certified reputation, the assessed agent, b, provides a set of ratings that they225
have previously been given by other agents. The weighting used in calculating
witness and certified reputation is !W (ri) = !Cr(ri) = !I(ri).
9
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Role-based trust uses ratings assigned to rules describing agent relationships,
e.g. if they are part of the same organisation, or there is a provider consumer
relationship. Rules have the form (rolea, roleb, t, e, v), representing if two agents230
a and b take roles rolea and roleb, then b is expected with a likelihood of e 2 [0, 1]
to have performance of v for term t in an interaction with a. To calculate role-
based trust, rules in the assessing agent’s database that match RR(a, b, t) are
aggregated using Equation 1, with !R(ri) = ei.
The composite term trust, T (a, b, t), in an agent with respect to a given term
t is calculated as a weighted mean of the component sources:
T (a, b, t) =
P
K2{I,W,R,Cr} !K · TK(a, b, t)P
K2{I,W,R,Cr} !K
(3)
where !I , !W , !R and !Cr are parameters that determine the importance of235
each component, !K = !K ·⇢K(a, b, t), and the reliability of the reputation value
for component K is ⇢K(a, b, t). The reliability of a reputation value is deter-
mined by a combination of the rating reliability and rating deviation reliability
(details of the calculations can be found in [4]).
2.4. The TRAVOS Reputation System240
TRAVOS is based on the Beta Reputation System [35] and extends it to
ignore reputation assessments from unreliable witnesses [5, 36, 12]. TRAVOS
uses interaction trust and witness reputation, computed using rating tuples
similar to those used in FIRE. Whereas in FIRE the rating value is a real
number, ratings in TRAVOS are binary, v 2 {0, 1}, where 0 is a negative rating
and 1 is positive. The component trust value agent a has in agent b with respect
to term t, is the expected value of a beta probability density function,
TK(a, b, t) = ↵K(a, b, t)
↵K(a, b, t) +  K(a, b, t)
, (4)
where ↵K(a, b, t) is 1 plus the number of relevant positive ratings and  K(a, b, t)
is 1 plus the number of relevant negative ratings,
↵K(a, b, t) = 1 + |{ri 2 RK(a, b, t)|vi = 1}|,
 K(a, b, t) = 1 + |{ri 2 RK(a, b, t)|vi = 0}|.
(5)
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The beta probability density function can also be used to compute a confi-
dence in the trust value, defined by the proportion of the distribution that lies
in a range centred around the expected value,
⇢K(a, b, t) =
R TK(a,b,t)+✏
TK(a,b,t) ✏ X
↵K(a,b,t) 1(1 X) K(a,b,t) 1dXR 1
0 U
↵K(a,b,t) 1(1  U) K(a,b,t) 1dU
, (6)
where ✏ is a user defined parameter to define the range considered.
As with FIRE, an assessing agent computes interaction trust from the set of
ratings, RI(a, b, t), in its database that match (a, b, t, , ). The interaction trust
is then TI(a, b, t), which has an associated confidence, ⇢I(a, b, t). If ⇢I(a, b, t) is
below a threshold set by the user, witnesses are asked for ratings of agent b for245
term t, which are used to compute the witness reputation.
Witnesses, w 2 W , provide opinions in the form of the number of posi-
tive, ↵W (w, b, t) and the number of negative ratings,  W (w, b, t), that they have
given b. Before the overall reputation is calculated, the witness opinions are
discounted based on their perceived accuracy to limit their e↵ect on the com-250
posite reputation score. TRAVOS stores previous ratings provided by witnesses
in observation tuples, (a,w, b, t, i, o, v), where, w is a witness that provided eval-
uator a with a set of ratings about provider b, which formed a beta probability
density distribution whose expected value determined the raw opinion value of
o. After processing this witness opinion and selecting b to interact with, a gave255
b a rating value of v in interaction i.
On receipt of a new opinion from a witness, w, an evaluator, a, queries
their observation database for records where the opinion, o, provided by w for
term t was similar. Two opinions are said to be similar if their expected values
are close (i.e. they both lie in the same discrete interval). The coherence of
the opinion provided, o, and the rating for the subsequent interaction, v, then
determines the reliability of the new opinion provided by the witness. Given this
reliability, the opinion is discounted and combined along with the interaction
11
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trust by summing the ↵ and   parameters,
↵(a, b, t) = ↵I(a, b, t) +
X
w2W
↵¯W (w, b, t)
 (a, b, t) =  I(a, b, t) +
X
w2W
 ¯W (w, b, t),
(7)
where ↵¯W (w, b, t) and  ¯W (w, b, t) are the discounted opinion parameters pro-
vided by witness w regarding agent b for term t. The composite term trust in
agent b for term t is then,
T (a, b, t) = ↵(a, b, t)
↵(a, b, t) +  (a, b, t)
. (8)
For full details on the calculation behind discounting see [12].
3. Multi-Term Reputation Model
In the previous section, we gave an overview of two di↵erent reputation
models, namely FIRE and TRAVOS. In order to provide a model-independent260
explanation approach, we must first specify a common model specification that
generalises di↵erent reputation models. This generalised model, which we refer
to as multi-term reputation model (MTRM), can be specialised by the addition
of the specific components of a particular reputation model. Note this MTRM
is not a new reputation model, but a model that captures concepts present in265
any reputation model. Therefore, explanations provided based on this model
are applicable to any reputation model. Concepts that are usual, e.g. recency,
but not used in all reputation models can be added in MTRM extensions. We
next introduce the MTRM concepts.
All reputation models consider a way for an agent to assess how an inter-
action with another agent occurred. In FIRE, for example, agents associate
a rating with those they interact with in [ 1,+1], while in TRAVOS agents
only record success or failure, i.e. ratings are in {0, 1}. These ratings are then
communicated to others who require additional information to inform their de-
cisions. In our model, we consider that an agent is associated with a set of trust
12
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ratings
ri = ha, b, t,K, vi (9)
where a is a source agent, b is target agent, t is a term, K is a reputation270
type, and v is a rating value. A particular reputation model may add additional
parameters, e.g. interaction as in FIRE. Trust ratings are associated with rep-
utation types, or components, according to the component of the model that
generates them. Each model incorporates a particular set of reputation types,
KSet. TRAVOS only includes interaction (I) and witness (W ) reputation types,275
while FIRE supplements those with role-based (R) and certified (Cr) reputation.
The set of ratings associated with a particular reputation type is RK(a, b, t).
These ratings are used to calculate a trust value TK(a, b, t), which combines
trust ratings in a single real value. In case of FIRE, as introduced in Section 2.3,
the trust value is a weighted mean of ratings, considering a recency function280
! (ri), while TRAVOS uses a probabilistic model. If a trust value is associated
with a reputation typeK, it means that it is derived from ratings only associated
with K.
Trust values associated with di↵erent reputation types must be combined to
form a single value. In MTRM, as its name indicates, we consider that agents285
can assess others with respect to di↵erent terms t 2 T , such as cost, quality
and timeliness. The component trust values can be combined to form the term
trust T (a, b, t). We do not assume that the term trust is calculated using a
specific method such as a weighted mean or sum, but rather we assume that
the term trust can be decomposed into weights !K and trust values TK(a, b, t),290
associated with di↵erent reputation types. This is straightforward in FIRE,
given that FIRE calculates trust as a weighted mean of weighted means. How-
ever, TRAVOS does not calculate a composite trust value from interaction and
witness trusts in this way, instead combining ratings from witnesses, after ad-
justment for reliability and relevance, to act as parameters of a beta probability295
distribution whose expected value determines the composite trust value. Con-
sequently, we use the TRAVOS model to compute the term trust from ratings,
13
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and then decompose this term trust into two trust values, one associated with
direct interaction trust, and another with witness trust.
TRAVOS computes an overall trust value, which in our case is the term trust,
by combining the direct interaction trust and witness opinions, after adjusting
them for perceived accuracy. The combination proceeds by summing the ↵ and
  parameters of the beta probability density functions, as in Equation 7. In
FIRE, the trust component weights are determined by user preferences, while
in TRAVOS, we define them as the proportion of the final beta probability
density function that the component parameters account for. For instance, the
interaction trust weight is,
!I(a, b, t) =
↵I(a, b, t) +  I(a, b, t)
↵I(a, b, t) +  I(a, b, t) +
P
w2W ↵¯W (w, b, t) +  ¯W (w, b, t)
(10)
and witness reputation weight is !W (a, b, t) = 1  !I(a, b, t).300
Finally, existing reputation models either do not consider terms (e.g. TRAVOS)
or often do not specify how to combine values for di↵erent terms into a single
trust score (as is the case with FIRE). Therefore, inspired by multi-attribute
utility theory [37], we consider weights that establish a trade-o↵ relationship
among terms, and view term trust as a utility value. The overall trust score is
then a weighted mean of term trusts, where the weights are agents’ preferences
for terms.
T (a, b) =
P
t2T !t · T (a, b, t)P
t2T !t
(11)
where the parameters !t correspond to a’s preferences regarding the relative
importance of terms, and T is the set of all terms.
Note that in order for reputation models to be abstracted to our MTRM,
they should either use a weighted sum approach, like FIRE, or be decomposable
into such an approach, like TRAVOS.305
As result, our MTRM is able to capture data such as that presented in Ta-
ble 1. In this table, we show a set of illustrative trust values from the perspective
of an agent A with respect to four other agents (B, C, D and E), considering
three di↵erent terms—Quality (Q), Timeliness (T) and Cost (Ct). For exam-
ple, TI(A,D, T ) = 0.95. These trust values are combinations of ratings by, for310
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Interaction Witness
Trust Values Trust Values Term Trusts Trust Score
Q T Ct Q T Ct Q T Ct
B 0.75 0.55 0.40 0.95 0.70 0.30 0.80 0.59 0.38 0.64
C 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.40 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.17
D 0.50 0.95 0.10 0.60 0.80 0.10 0.53 0.91 0.10 0.58
E 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.30 0.40 0.54 0.38
Weight 0.45 0.35 0.20
Table 1: Running Example: Agents and Scores.
example, a recency function. Similarly, there are trust values that come from
witnesses, which are shown in the columns labelled with “Witness Trust Values”
in Table 1, for instance TW (A,C,Q) = 0.40.
The term trust, in this case, combines interaction and witness trust values.
Assume that agent A uses the following weights: (i) interaction weight: !I =315
0.75; and (ii) witness weight: !W = 0.25. As result, for example, we have the
quality trust with respect to B would be T (A,B,Q) = 0.75⇥0.75+0.25⇥0.95 =
0.80.
Similarly, term trusts are combined using weights, which are shown in the
last row of Table 1, for terms resulting in the overall trust score, shown in the last320
column in Table 1—for instance, T (A,C) = 0.17. Based on these calculations, it
can be seen that the agent with the best trust score is agent B. Although there
is a mathematical explanation that leads to this, it is hard to extract intuitive
arguments that justify why B is the most trustworthy agent for agent A. This is
done by our explanation approach, which is presented in the following section.325
4. Explaining Reputation Assessments
Now that we have a common reputation model, we can specify a method for
producing explanations. An explanation justifies why a particular agent (e.g.
a service provider) has a better reputation, i.e. the overall trust score, than
another from the perspective of a given agent (e.g. a client). Our explanations330
are produced by generating a set of arguments, which give the key aspects
15
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that distinguish the two agents being compared, being all arguments needed to
understand which agent is better. Arguments are instantiated with parameters
selected using specified algorithms. We first present arguments that can be part
of an explanation, and then show how to use these arguments to produce an335
explanation.
Our method not only produces arguments for our common trust model,
MTRM, but also considers the specific details of di↵erent reputation models.
Therefore we have generic arguments, generated based on MTRM, which are
supplemented with model-specific arguments. We show as examples of the latter340
specific arguments for both FIRE and TRAVOS, which are used as illustrative
reputation assessment models in this paper.
4.1. Explanation Arguments
We first look at the possible classes of reasons why a provider may have a
better reputation than another. Such classes are associated with the di↵erent345
components that are part of MTRM. Each class has a corresponding argument
type that can be used as part of an explanation. The generation of arguments
here is similar to the identification of decisive criteria to explain choices made
using multi-attribute decision models. We select, adapt and combine the algo-
rithms of Labreuche [9] and Nunes et al. [10] to produce our arguments. As350
described earlier, an agent’s overall trust score is a weighted mean of term trust
values, and each of these can be decomposed into trust values for di↵erent rep-
utation types. Correspondingly, our argument types are split into three groups,
namely decisive terms, decisive reputation types, and reputation model-specific
arguments, as described below. For simplicity, but without loss of generality,355
we assume that ratings are in [0, 1], given that the approaches we leverage use
this range. FIRE and TRAVOS ratings can be easily mapped to this range.
4.1.1. Argument: Decisive Terms
The reputation of a provider for a client is a balance among trust values for
terms, corresponding to aspects of an interaction or service such as quality or360
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timeliness. Some terms may be irrelevant with respect to why one provider is
more trusted than another, either because they have low weight for the client
or because the di↵erences between term trust values for providers are small. To
explain why provider b has a better overall trust score than provider b0 for an
agent a, we must identify the decisive terms D(a, b, b0) = hP,Ci that lead to this365
conclusion, where P and C are sets of terms that are the decisive pros and cons
of b with respect to b0, respectively. For example, if P = {quality, cost} and
C = {timeliness}, we can derive an argument of the form “b is more trusted
than b0 because it has higher trust for quality and cost, even though b0 has higher
trust for timeliness”.370
A trivial case is that of domination, when b has advantages compared to b0
with respect to some terms and no disadvantages with respect to the remaining
terms. According to Labreuche, important terms are those that have weights
higher than the reference weight, which is defined as the weight that makes all
terms equality important (used in the not on average anchor,  NOA). That is,
if there are n terms, the reference weight is !A = 1/n. We need to adapt this to
take into account the trust values for terms. Considering the di↵erence between
term trust for a term t for providers b and b0,  t = |T (a, b, t)   T (a, b0, t)|, we
can say that the reference value di↵erence is  A =
P
t2T  t
|T | , where T is the
set of terms. Thus,  A is the average of the di↵erences between trust values
for all terms. Given the reference weight and reference value di↵erence, the
reference weighted value di↵erence is !A ·  A. Decisive terms in the case of
domination are consequently those whose weighted value di↵erence is higher
than the reference weighted value di↵erence, i.e.
DDom(a, b, b0) = h{t 2 T |!t · t > !A · A}, ;i (12)
Informally, decisive pros are terms that have: (i) above average weight and
value, (ii) very high weight, or (iii) very high value. In this context “very high”
means that even though  t <  A, !t is high enough to cause !t · t > !A · A,
and the same reasoning is applied to  t. As provider b dominates b0, there are
no cons in this case.375
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In order to illustrate the domination case, we use the example introduced in
the previous section, considering the values presented in Table 1. By analysing
the term trusts of agents B and C, it is possible to see that B dominates C,
because B has higher trust values for all terms. In order to identify the decisive
terms, we first calculate the reference value di↵erence, which is
 A =
|0.80  0.18|+ |0.59  0.19|+ |0.38  0.15|
3
=
0.63 + 0.40 + 0.23
3
= 0.42
As !A = 0.33, !A · A = 0.14. Calculating the weighted di↵erences for quality,
timeliness and costs, we obtain 0.28, 0.14 and 0.05, respectively. As only the
first two are above the reference weighted value di↵erence1, they are the decisive
terms. An explanation argument, in this case, would be as follows.
Example 1: B has a better reputation than C, because it is better in all aspects
that you consider in your preferences, mainly with respect to timeliness, and quality.
When dominance is not the case, we could apply either Labreuche’s an-
chors [9] or the patterns of Nunes et al. [10] to select decisive criteria. As the
number of terms |T | may be high and Labreuche’s approach may have perfor-
mance issues [10], we use the latter, which is briefly explained as follows. We
first define T+ = {t 2 T |T (a, b, t) > T (a, b0, t)} and T  = {t 2 T |T (a, b, t) <
T (a, b0, t)}, which are the sets of all pros and cons of b with respect to b0, re-
spectively. Using these patterns, the decisive criteria is DDC(a, b, b0) = hT ⇤+, T ⇤ i,
such that T ⇤+ ✓ T+, T ⇤  ✓ T , andX
t2T⇤+
!t · t >
X
t2T /T⇤ 
!t · t (13)
T ⇤+ and T ⇤  are both minimal in the sense of ✓. When T ⇤  = ;, it is a decisive380
criteria pattern, otherwise it is a trade-o↵ resolution pattern.
In order to better understand the selection of decisive terms when there
is no dominance, we use our running example. Consider agents B and D.
1The reference weighted value is, more precisely, 0.139.
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According to the trust value, the former has two pros, namely quality (weighted
di↵erence is 0.12) and cost (weighted di↵erence is 0.06), while the latter has385
only timeliness (weighted di↵erence is 0.11) as pros. In order to justify why D
is less trustworthy than B, considering only quality would be enough, because its
weighted di↵erence is already higher than the weighted di↵erence of timeliness
(its con). Therefore, quality is B’s decisive criteria with respect to D. This is
illustrated in the argument below.390
Example 2: B has a better reputation than D, mainly due to quality.
4.1.2. Argument: Decisive Reputation Types
The key argument produced to explain why provider b is more trusted than
provider b0 is the set of terms that are the decisive pros of b with respect to b0,
and occasionally the decisive cons of b0. Term trusts are derived from ratings of
di↵erent kinds of sources, referred to as reputation types,K, being a composition395
of trust values considering di↵erent sources. Therefore, we can again leverage
algorithms used for multi-attribute decision models, to refine the explanation.
When b dominates b0 for a term t, i.e. there exists K in the set of repu-
tation types such that TK(a, b, t) > TK(a, b0, t) and there is no K 0 such that
TK0(a, b, t) < TK0(a, b0, t), then stating that t is a decisive term is su cient,400
and no additional argument is needed. In other cases, it is relevant to add
new arguments to the explanation. For example, assume that b has a higher
trust score than b0 considering a component I (for interaction trust), b0 has a
higher trust score than b considering W (for witness trust), and !I   !W (I is
more important than W ). In this case, it is helpful to state the argument “even405
though b0 has higher ratings from third party reports, b has higher ratings from
direct experience, which is more important.”
Our pairwise analysis of weights and values is done with Labreuche’s invert
anchor,  IV T . Although this anchor had performance issues in a previously
performed experiment with human participants [10], this occurred where there410
was a high number of attributes, which in our case corresponds to reputation
19
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types. We assume there is a small number of reputation types (e.g. there are
four in FIRE and two in TRAVOS) and so performance is not an issue here.
The argument given for explaining trust values considering reputation types
is a permutation ⇡(a, b, b0, t) = {(K,K 0) 2 S2}, where S ✓ KSet, such that415
T (a, b, t) <⇡(a,b,b0,t) T (a, b0, t). The operator <⇡(a,b,b0,t) compares two term
trusts applying the permutation ⇡(a, b, b0, t) to reputation type weights. Conse-
quently, ⇡(a, b, b0, t) gives a set of pairwise changes in weights, which causes the
term trust of b0 to be higher than that of b. Labreuche provides a branch-and-
bound algorithm for the determination of this kind of explanation [9], which for420
brevity is not reproduced here. Given that there are limited possible permuta-
tions in our case, algorithmic e ciency is not critical.
Considering our running example, we have a case of decisive reputation types
considering agents B and E with respect to the timeliness term. The trust value
of agent B is better considering interaction ratings (0.55 > 0.20), while the trust425
value of agent E is better considering witnesses ratings (1.00 > 0.70). If the
weights given to the interaction and witnesses ratings were inverted, E would
have a higher term trust than B—timeliness trust would be 0.66 for B and
0.80 for E, instead of 0.59 and 0.40, respectively. We present below a textual
argument that gives this explanation.430
Example 3: Considering timeliness, even though E has higher reputation with
respect to witness reputation, which is less important, B has has higher reputation with
respect to own interaction, which is more important.
4.1.3. Reputation Model-specific Arguments
The way that trust and reputation values are derived from ratings is di↵erent
for each reputation model. As a consequence, it is possible to provide further
arguments other than our generic arguments if we take model particularities
into account. In this case, model-specific arguments can be generated and used435
to supplement the generic arguments. In addition, arguments can be added
not only to explain trust scores, but to give further details about trust values
20
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and term trusts. Here, to illustrate these possibilities, we present two model-
specific arguments: a FIRE-specific argument associated with trust values and
a TRAVOS-specific argument to further explain term trusts.440
FIRE-specific Argument: Recency. The trust value for a particular reputation
type in FIRE is calculated through a weighted mean of available ratings vi.
Weights can be used to assign more importance to particular ratings, specifically
more recent ratings have a higher weight. The ratings are thus scaled using a
rating recency factor  , as introduced before. The recency factor may play a
key role both in the overall trust score and in the trust value for particular t and
K. The overall trust score of a provider uses ! (ri) to combine available ratings
RK(a, b, t), associated with a particular a, b and t. In this case, we can also
consider a reference rating weight function !A K , which is the average weight,
i.e.
!A K =
1
|RK(a, b, t)| (14)
Given this reference function, two situations might occur. First, the order
derived from the overall trust score of providers b and b0, calculated taking
into account recency, conflicts with the order derived from the overall trust
score calculated using !A K . That is, we have T (a, b) > T (a, b0) and T A(a, b) <
T A(a, b0), where T A(a, b) is the overall trust calculated using !A K . Second, even445
though this situation may not occur, there may still be cases where TK(a, b, t) >
TK(a, b0, t) and T AK (a, b, t) < T AK (a, b0, t), for a particular K and t. In the first
scenario, we add an argument F(a, b, b0) to the explanation explaining that
“although on average b0 has higher ratings than b, recently b has been receiving
higher ratings than b0, which are more valuable”. In the second case, we must450
add a finer-grained argument F(a, b, b0, t,K), for specific K and t: “although
on average b0 has higher ratings for t than b, considering K, recently b has been
receiving higher ratings than b0, which are more valuable”.
TRAVOS-specific Argument: Low Confidence. FIRE uses weights of reputa-
tion types to express their importance for a particular assessor agent, and they455
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remain fixed unless an assessor explicitly changes them. Therefore, a set of in-
teraction and witness ratings does not influence the weights of reputation types
to calculate a trust score. TRAVOS, on the other hand, evaluates how useful
interaction ratings are, before taking witness ratings into account. If an asses-
sor does not have enough confidence into its own ratings, i.e. the confidence is460
below a given threshold, then witness ratings are used, otherwise it will rely on
its own ratings.
Therefore, it is important to know whether the trust score is based solely
on interaction ratings or on both interaction and witness ratings. If ⇢I(a, b, t)
(interaction confidence) is below a threshold set by the assessor, for any of the465
providers being assessed, it means that witness ratings are being taken into
account to consider b better than b0, i.e. TW (a, b, t) > TW (a, b0, t). When this
is the case, we add an argument C(a, b, b0, t) to the explanation, which can
be written in natural language in the following form: “although you have had
limited previous interactions with either b or b0 with respect to t, the former is470
considered better than the latter by witnesses”.
4.2. Explanation Generation
Above, we introduced the di↵erent arguments that can be used to form an
explanation to justify why a provider b has a higher trust score than a provider b0.
In this section, we show how to generate such an explanation. We first identify475
our coarse-grained argument to justify trust scores. This argument is composed
of decisive terms, which has the form D(a, b, b0) and gives the decisive pros and
cons justifying the overall trust scores. When b dominates b0, i.e. exists t 2 T
such that T (a, b, t) > T (a, b0, t) and there is no t0 2 T such that T (a, b, t0) <
T (a, b0, t0), the decisive criteria are given by DDom(a, b, b0), otherwise they are480
given by DDC(a, b, b0).
Once we know the decisive criteria that justify trust scores, we can provide
fine-grained arguments that provide further understanding, considering decisive
terms t 2 P . First, we search for those that have a trust score associated with
decisive reputation types. This is given by ⇡(a, b, b0, t), which is a permutation485
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Algorithm 1: Expl(a, b, b0)
Input: a: an agent; b, b0: service providers
Output:  : explanation with a set of arguments
1 if dominates (b,b’) then
2   {DDom(a, b, b0)};
3 else
4   {DDC(a, b, b0)};
5 addSpecificArguments ( );
6 foreach t 2 P do
7 if 9⇡(a, b, b0, t) such that T (a, b, t) <⇡ T (a, b0, t) then
8     [ {⇡(a, b, b0, t)};
9 addSpecificTermTrustArguments ( , t, T (a, b, t), T (a, b, t0));
10 foreach K 2 KSet do
11 addSpecificTrustValueArguments ( , t,K, TK(a, b, t), TK(a, b, t0));
12 return  ;
of weights given for the di↵erent reputation types, indicating that the weights
involved in that permutation are decisive, because if they were assigned in a
di↵erent way, we would have T (a, b, t) < T (a, b0, t). Second, we add model-
specific arguments. For example, in the case of FIRE, the arguments F(a, b, b0)
and F(a, b, b0, t,K) are added when the selected recency weight function is the490
cause for making the trust value of b higher than that of b0, i.e. if equal weights
were given to all ratings, this would not have been the case. While in the case
of TRAVOS, the argument C(a, b, b0, t) is added when interaction ratings are
limited, and thus the opinions of witnesses are taken into account.
This method is presented in Algorithm 1, which generates an explanation495
Expl(a, b, b0) to justify why provider b has a higher trust score than provider b0,
for agent a. An explanation is thus a set of arguments of the types introduced
above. Note that in Algorithm 1, fine-grained arguments are generated only
for terms that are decisive pros. However, arguments may be also generated
for decisive cons, if one wants to provide further details about the trust score.500
No fine-grained arguments are generated for the remaining terms, since they
are not decisive. In addition, Algorithm 1 calls functions that add additional
arguments to the explanations. These functions must be specified for specific
trust models. For example, in the case of FIRE we can add recency arguments
23
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Algorithm 2: FIRE: addSpecificArguments
Input:  : explanation
Output:  : explanation with added arguments
1 if T (a, b) > T (a, b0) and T A(a, b) < T A(a, b0) then
2     [ {F(a, b, b0)};
3 return  ;
Algorithm 3: FIRE: addSpecificTrustValueArguments
Input:  : explanation; t: term; K: reputation type TK(a, b, t), TK(a, b0, t): trust values
Output:  : explanation with added arguments
1 if TK(a, b, t) > TK(a, b0, t) and T AK (a, b, t) < T AK (a, b0, t) then
2     [ {F(a, b, b0, t,K)};
3 return  ;
Algorithm 4: TRAVOS: addSpecificTermTrustArguments
Input:  : explanation; t: term; ⇢I(a, b, t), ⇢I(a, b
0, t): confidence; TW (a, b, t),
TW (a, b0, t): trust values
Output:  : explanation with added arguments
1 if (⇢I(a, b, t) < ✏ or ⇢I(a, b
0, t) < ✏) and TW (a, b, t) > TW (a, b0, t). then
2     [ {C(a, b, b0, t)};
3 return  ;
to explain the trust score as a whole and particular trust values, as shown in505
Algorithms 2 and 3. Similarly, for TRAVOS we can add arguments to explain
term trust, as shown in Algorithm 4.
Finally, we now show how an explanation Expl(a, b, b0), which is a set of
arguments, can be translated to human-readable form. For illustration, we
adopt a textual form. Parts shown in brackets are optional, and thus may not510
appear in all explanations. Note that two of the optional arguments are FIRE-
specific and one is TRAVOS-specific. In addition, optional arguments may be
added more than once, depending on the number of arguments that are part of
the explanation.
Provider b has a better reputation than Provider b0 mainly
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due to list of pros in P [, even though Provider b0 provides better
list of cons in C ]C 6=;.
[In addition, Provider b0 has, on average, higher ratings than Provider b , but
Provider b has been recently receiving higher ratings than Provider b0 , which are
more valuable.]F(a,b,b0)
[Considering Term t , even though Provider b0 has a higher trust value consid-
ering Reputation Type K , which is less important, Provider b has a higher trust
value considering Reputation Type K0 , which is more important.]8(K,K0)2⇡(a,b,b0,t)
[Moreover, although you have had limited previous interactions with either
Provider b or Provider b0 with respect to Term t , the former is considered
better than the latter by witnesses.]8C(a,b,b0,t)
[Moreover, Provider b0 has, on average, higher ratings for Term t than b,
considering Reputation Type K , but Provider b has been recently receiving higher
ratings than Provider b0 , which are more valuable.]8F(a,b,b0,t,K)
5. User Study515
In this section, we therefore present a user study conducted to evaluate our
proposed explanation approach.
5.1. Goal and Research Questions
Reputation assessment models are often used in multiagent systems to allow
autonomous agents (which can be humans) to identify in which agents they can520
trust to interact with. Our explanations can be used as a means for agents
to exchange information regarding the reputation of other agents, without the
need for exposing the reputation model details or detailed scores. However, as
our explanations reveal less information than components of trust scores, we
must evaluate if they are helpful for agents or users to better choose another525
agent (which can be, e.g. a service provider) to interact with. More specifically,
we aim to answer the following research questions.
1. Are our explanations more e↵ective in helping users to understand reputation-
based recommendations than quantitative scores alone?
2. How do users perceive the usefulness of our explanations?530
25
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In order to answer these questions, we present our explanations to users using
our example explanation templates. Our hypothesis is that users are better
able to understand the rationale behind recommendations when they receive
explanations instead of only quantitative information (i.e. reputation scores).
Our first research question is aligned with this hypothesis. However, given that535
the e↵ectiveness of such explanations may be di↵erent to how users perceive
their usefulness, the second research question aims to explore this relationship.
5.2. Procedure
Our user study followed an adaptation of the protocol previously adopted to
conduct user studies that involve the evaluation of explanations in recommender540
systems [11, 16]. The steps of this protocol are the following [11]: (1) get sample
ratings from the user; (2) compute a recommendation r; (3) for each explanation
system, present r to the user with e’s explanation and ask the user to rate r;
and (4) ask the user to try r and then rate it again. In the remainder of this
section we present the steps we followed to conduct the user study.545
Construction of Provider Model. Our study involves participants rating and
receiving recommendations of service providers based on reputation models.
In order to have a set of providers to be part of the study, we create a set
of simulated providers. Providers are described with a model that specifies
the probabilities of transaction outcomes, e.g. considering a provider of delivery550
services, an outcome is the number of days taken to deliver a package. Outcomes
are associated with terms, e.g. the outcome of delivering a package is associated
with the term timeliness.
Participant Data and Preference Elicitation. Participants initiate the study by
providing data about themselves and preferences for di↵erent terms. Addition-555
ally, they provide preferences for reputation types, required by the FIRE model.
Collection of Sample Ratings. From each participant, we collect 15 sample rat-
ings in the following way: (i) randomly select a provider, (ii) simulate an inter-
action by generating outcomes based on the provider model, and (iii) present
26
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the result of the interaction to the participant and ask them to rate the provider560
with respect to each term. We present an example of an interaction outcome in
Figure 1a. Note that providers may be selected more than once, and likely have
di↵erent outcomes in each interaction. Each set of ratings is associated with a
round, which is interpreted as a timestamp for FIRE and a round for TRAVOS.
These sample ratings are used to build both the FIRE and TRAVOS models for565
each participant. Participants provide ratings with a value between 0 and 1 (or
not applicable). For FIRE, this value is used as is, and for TRAVOS we used a
threshold of 0.5 to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful interactions.
Moreover, TRAVOS requires a confidence threshold, which was set to 0.2. We
selected a low threshold given that participants have few repeated experiences570
with the same provider, causing confidence to be usually low. In this way, we
balance situations where witness opinions are used or not.
Explanation Evaluation. We randomly select three providers from the set of
providers and rank them using their computed reputation scores (step 2 of the
protocol), which are based on the reputation model, ratings (from the partic-575
ipant and peers) and preferences. We randomly select the model to be used
and which explanatory information is provided to users: (i) FIRE with scores
alone, (ii) FIRE with explanation arguments alone, (iii) TRAVOS with scores
alone, or (iv) TRAVOS with explanation arguments alone. Examples of expla-
nation arguments and scores are shown in Figures 2a and 2b, respectively. Note580
that participants are not aware that there are two underlying reputation mod-
els driving the recommendations. Then, we show to participants the provider
ranking, together with the selected explanatory information (step 3 of the pro-
tocol), and ask them to answer in a 7-point Likert scale whether they agree
with the statement: Considering the information provided above, I would order585
the presented providers in the same way that they were ordered, according to
my preferences. Next, we show participants the same ranking together with the
full provider model (i.e. the probabilities of the outcomes), such as presented in
Figure 1b, so that they know all possible details about this provider, and ask
27
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(a) Sample Ratings: Generated Outcome.
(b) Full Provider Information.
Figure 1: Screenshots of the Web Application (1).
them again the same question (step 4 of the protocol). Based on these answers590
we measure how the scores given for the first question (scores or explanation
arguments) di↵er from the scores given for the provider model. With full in-
formation of providers’ probabilities, participants know exactly what to expect
by interacting with providers; however, this complete information is usually un-
known. Therefore, the participant score with respect to full information is used595
as a baseline: the closer the participant score for explanation arguments or rep-
utation scores, the better. This is therefore the metric we collect to evaluate
the e↵ectiveness of explanatory information, in the form of absolute di↵erence
between the two answers, referred to as score di↵erence. This step is repeated
10 times for each participant.600
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(a) Explanation Arguments.
(b) Explanation Scores.
Figure 2: Screenshots of the Web Application (2).
Perceived E↵ectiveness Questionnaire. To collect information regarding the per-
ceived value of the provided explanations, we ask participants to evaluate (in a
7-point Likert scale) the two forms of describing providers (with textual explana-
tions and with reputation scores) with respect to (i) transparency: I understand
why the providers were ranked in the presented way through the explanations and605
(ii) trust: I feel that these explanations are trustworthy. In addition, we also ask
an open-ended question to participants, in which participants have to explain
their preference for scores or explanation arguments.
5.3. Target Domain and Application Support
To execute the procedure described above, we implemented a web application610
to support the study, from which screenshots are presented in Figure 1 and 2.
We selected delivery services as the domain, given that it is suitable for our
scenario, because: (i) people in general have used this kind of service at least
29
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Table 2: Provider Model and Terms.
Outcome Domain Values Outcome Term
Model
Number of
days to deliver
Integer > 0 Normal
distribution
(µ, )
Timeliness
Maximum
days to deliver
Integer > 0 Constant
Price Double > 0 Constant Price
Parcel
Condition
Perfect Conditions
Damaged Package
Damaged Product
Lost
Probabilities Quality of
Service
Customer
Service
Easy to contact and problem solved
Easy to contact but problem unresolved
Di cult to contact but problem solved
Di cult to contact and problem unresolved
Probabilities Customer
Support
- - - Reliability
once and, if not, they are aware of how it works and its possible outcomes, and
(ii) participants do not need to concretely experience such services to be able615
to evaluate them, i.e. the domain can be simulated.
Service providers are modelled with probabilities associated with di↵erent
outcomes, which are listed in Table 2. For example, providers are associated
with a constant value that indicates the maximum days they take to deliver
a package. They are also associated with a variable representing the average620
number of days that it takes to deliver packages and the standard deviation.
Therefore, to simulate the number of days taken we used randomisation with a
normal distribution defined by these parameters.
Participants evaluate providers with respect to each term presented in the
rightmost column of Table 2. These terms are associated with the outcome that625
we believe that the participant would take into account to rate a term. Note
that reliability is not associated with any outcome, since we assume that this is
30
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Table 3: Characteristics of Participants (N = 30).
Age 16–25 years 26–35 years
23 (77%) 7 (23%)
Gender Male Female
29 (97%) 1 (3%)
Course Undergraduate Graduate
Level 23 (77%) 7 (23%)
related to repeated experiences that the participant has with the same provider.
We modelled 10 providers, each being associated with two sets of model
parameters. We use the first set of parameters to collect the first half of the630
set of sample ratings, and the second set of parameters to collect the remaining
samples. In this way, we simulate change in the providers’ behaviour, and allow
for the fact that the ratings provided can change over time.
5.4. Participants and Preferences
Our study participants were selected using convenience sampling. Gradu-635
ate and undergraduate students of a Brazilian Computer Science program were
invited to participate as volunteers. Data was collected in two separate time
slots, and participants that participated within the same time slot were consid-
ered peers, in order to compute witness trust. In total, our study involved 30
participants, such that 9 participated in the first time slot and 21 participated640
in the second. We detail characteristics of the participants in Table 3.
In addition to collecting participant characteristics, we also asked them to
provide their preferences with respect to reputation types and terms. Descrip-
tive information was provided to allow them to understand the required infor-
mation. In Table 4, we present the preferences provided by participants. Note645
that in this study we consider only interaction and witness reputation types.
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Table 4: Participant Preferences for Reputation Types and Terms.
Reputation Type/Term M SD
Interaction 0.635 0.11
Witness 0.365 0.11
Customer Support 0.138 0.08
Price 0.202 0.09
Quality of Service 0.237 0.05
Reliability 0.242 0.07
Timeliness 0.181 0.07
5.5. Results and Analysis
We now present our study results, analysing first objective e↵ectiveness and
then perceived e↵ectiveness. Hereafter explanation arguments and trust scores
are referred to as arguments and scores, respectively.650
5.5.1. Objective E↵ectiveness
The metric used to analyse objective e↵ectiveness is the score di↵erence
between that given to explanatory and full information. Our aim is to evaluate
collected scores in a single group but, because we had two separate participant
groups (in order to obtain witness ratings), we first investigated whether results655
obtained are similar for both groups. We ran a Mann-Whitney’s U test to
compare group responses and, as expected, their is no significant di↵erence
between the scores provided by the two groups (U = 9436, p-value = 0.98).
Considering participant scores, we obtained the results presented in the sec-
ond (mean, M) and third (standard deviation, SD) columns of Table 5. Results660
are split into four groups (rows), according to the reputation model used (FIRE
or TRAVOS) and the provided explanatory information (arguments or scores).
Score di↵erences for the four groups are also shown in Figure 3a, in a box plot,
which presents the mean, median and variance of values. As can be seen, results
diverge between FIRE and TRAVOS: while scores performed better considering665
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FIRE, arguments outperformed scores considering TRAVOS. Despite these dif-
ferences, a Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that the di↵erences are not significant
( 2 = 13.7, p = 0.94). Although arguments and scores achieved similar results,
this is already evidence of the e↵ectiveness of our arguments. Arguments refer
to a small portion of the information revealed by scores (it selects only decisive670
criteria, and provides further information only with respect to them). Therefore,
we state our first finding as follows.
Finding 1: Information that is not present in arguments can indeed be
discarded, because it is not helpful to better evaluate providers, as otherwise
using scores would have had a better performance.
Note that scores and arguments were presented separately in our study in
order to understand the e↵ectiveness of arguments in isolation, but we are not
suggesting that this should be the case in real applications. We assume that675
they can be presented together, so that they can complement each other.
This initial analysis of our results showed that the di↵erences among the four
groups are not statistically significant. However, a deeper analysis allowed us to
reveal interesting findings, which explain the contradicting results between FIRE
and TRAVOS. First, we analysed whether the di↵erence between the values680
obtained for FIRE and TRAVOS was due to the model quality, i.e., one model
produces rankings that better match users opinions. Model quality is evaluated
by checking whether the ranking produced by the reputation model matches the
ranking that the users would produce, when they are aware of the full provider
information. Consequently, in order to evaluate model quality, we used only685
the scores given by participants considering the full provider information. As
shown in Table 6, rankings using trust scores calculated by FIRE and TRAVOS
received similar ratings. Moreover, roughly, the same amount of participants
agreed with the rankings produced by models. Indeed, Mann-Whitneys U test
indicates that the di↵erence between the scores obtained with full information690
is not significant (U = 11482, p-value = 0.7).
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Figure 3: Overview of Scores Di↵erences.
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Table 6: Quality of Reputation Assessment Models.
Reputation Model M SD Agree Disagree Neutral
FIRE 4.48 2.00 56.25% 38.75% 5.00%
TRAVOS 4.37 2.17 55.71% 41.43% 2.86%
Second, we investigated whether the model-specific arguments played a key
role in our results. However, this was also not the case. In our results 61.96%
of the provided explanations contained model-specific arguments (61.36% for
FIRE, and 62.67% for TRAVOS). In columns 6–7 of Table 5, we detail the695
score di↵erences between explanations provided with and without model-specific
argument. We ran a Kruskal-Wallis test that showed that the di↵erences are
not significant ( 2 = 0.22, p = 0.97).
We then analysed whether the agreement with model influenced the results.
Scores were split into three groups: (i) agree: when participants provided a700
score greater than 4 considering the full provider information, (ii) disagree:
when participants provided a score lower than 4, and (iii) neutral : when partic-
ipants provided a score equals to 4. Results are detailed in the last six columns
of Table 5. They are also shown in Figure 3b, where the x-axis has labels with
three letters: the first stands for Agree, Disagree, or Neutral, the second stands705
for FIRE or TRAVOS, and the third stands for Arguments or Scores. We ob-
served that participants, in general, tend to agree with the ranking based on
explanatory information, because this is only the information they have, which
is in accordance with the ranking (the ranking is derived from scores). Conse-
quently, changes occur more often from agree to disagree than from disagree to710
agree, i.e., participants more often agree with the ranking considering explana-
tory information, and then change their opinion to disagree when they learn the
full provider information. A Kruskal Wallis test revealed a significant di↵erence
among the groups ( 2 = 97.7, p < 0.01). A post-hoc test using Mann-Whitney
tests with Bonferroni correction showed significant di↵erences between the agree715
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groups AFA, AFS and all disagree groups, and the agree groups ATA, ATS and
the disagree groups (DFA, DFA, DTS). There is no significant di↵erence between
ATA and ATS, and DTA. This supports our second main finding.
Finding 2: Except arguments provided for TRAVOS (i.e.
TRAVOS/Arguments), all combinations of reputation model with
explanatory information (i.e. FIRE/Arguments, FIRE/Scores and
TRAVOS/Scores) persuades participants to agree with the ranking.
Our explanation approach thus managed to be not (or less) persuasive for
one of the models, and this is a positive aspect of our approach. This result720
becomes evident in Figure 4, in which we show the distribution of how par-
ticipants evaluated the ranking based on explanatory information (divisions in
columns shown in x-axis) according to how they actually evaluate it, i.e. based
on full provider information (y-axis). For example, from all cases in which par-
ticipants evaluated FIRE/Arguments and they agreed with the model based725
on full provider information, in 90% they agreed with the ranking based on
explanatory information, in 6% they disagreed with the model (when in fact
they agree), and in 4% they were neutral with the model. In most of the cases,
participants agreed with the ranking based on explanatory information. Only
with TRAVOS/Arguments, did they manage to more often perceive based on730
arguments that they actually disagree with the ranking (35% of the cases).
We further investigated why this occurred, because this result is unexpected
given that: (i) the reputation models are equally good, and (ii) explanation ar-
guments are similar in FIRE and TRAVOS except for model-specific arguments,
but explanations with model-specific arguments are not better than those with-735
out. A key di↵erence between FIRE and TRAVOS is that FIRE uses weights for
reputation types that are given and TRAVOS calculates them, based on sim-
ilarity between witnesses and interaction ratings. Consequently, even though
the decisive reputation types argument is used for both FIRE and TRAVOS,
it reveals information of di↵erent nature. While in FIRE it just acknowledges740
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Agree Disagree Neutral
Neutral Travos/Scores 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Travos/Arguments 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Fire/Scores 75.00% 25.00% 0.00%
Fire/Arguments 75.00% 0.00% 25.00%
Disagree Travos/Scores 79.00% 21.00% 0.00%
Travos/Arguments 59.00% 35.00% 6.00%
Fire/Scores 76.00% 21.00% 3.00%
Fire/Arguments 82.00% 12.00% 6.00%
Agree Travos/Scores 90.00% 8.00% 3.00%
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Figure 4: Distribution of evaluation based on explanatory information by agreement with the
model.
participants that their preference for reputation types played a key role in the
recommender, in TRAVOS it reveals a detail of the model that may be not in
accordance with the participant preferences, e.g., the model gave importance
to witnesses opinions while the participant believes that such opinions are not
that important. Therefore, our hypothesis that explains this result leads to our745
third finding.
Finding 3: Arguments that reveal implicit model information, which
is the result of a calculation or an assumption regarding user preferences,
are essential for users to better understand the rationale behind reputation
assessments and use such information to make better decisions.
5.5.2. Perceived E↵ectiveness
In addition to the evaluation of the objective e↵ectiveness of our approach,
we also analysed how participants perceive the explanations. Results with re-
spect to transparency and trust in our explanations, presented in Figure 5, show750
that participants prefer scores instead of textual explanations. A Wilcoxon
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Figure 5: Questionnaire Scores: Transparency and Trust.
Signed-ranks test indicated that the di↵erence between scores (M = 6.17; SD
= 1.02) and arguments (M = 4.83; SD = 1.53) with respect to transparency is
statistically di↵erent (W = 25.5; p < 0.01), and the di↵erence between scores
(M = 5.73; SD = 1.53) and arguments (M = 3.70; SD = 1.39) with respect to755
transparency is also statistically di↵erent (W = 58.5; p < 0.01). This result was
expected given that our explanation arguments, when translated to a textual
form, requires the user to read a possibly large set of sentences, and a previous
study [10] showed that this may cause users to dislike it. Based on this, we state
our fourth and last finding.760
Finding 4: It is important to identify graphical forms of presenting the
information captured by our explanation arguments.
Note that although participants indicated that scores were more transparent
than explanation arguments, as shown, they are similarly e↵ective and argu-
ments are less persuasive under certain circumstances. Moreover, even though
lengthy explanations are criticised by participants, they do not impact on ef-
fectiveness or e ciency. This is shown in Figure fig:explanationLength, which765
39
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
shows the lack of correlation between the explanation length and score di↵er-
ences (e↵ectiveness) and time to analyse them (e ciency). The results of our
subjective analysis, however, provide evidence of the need for better means of
translating our explanation arguments into a human-readable presentation for-
mat.770
Interestingly, some participants did not realise that the textual-based ex-
planations were explaining the scores, and believed that the arguments were
trying to convince them to agree with the ranking. When justifying their trans-
parency and trust scores, five participants reported that textual explanations
can persuade them and scores cannot, mainly because they can see the exact775
di↵erence between scores, but our results show that this is not the case. In
fact, as discussed in the related work section, a study concluded that showing
ratings from neighbours can persuade users to accept recommendations [13],
so this previous study and ours converge to the same direction. Four partici-
pants highlighted benefits of our arguments, such as providing meaning to small780
quantitative di↵erences or analysing recency. One of the participants made the
following comment: “The explanations with scores can [be] ambiguous some-
times, specially when scores di↵er on small amounts e.g How much is 0.002 of
reliability? However, textual explanations not only remove that ambiguity, but
also make certain aspects of the ordering explicit, such as your personal weights,785
and recent scoring being more important than overall, for example.” Finally, two
participants reported that although they prefer scores, the textual explanations
provide complementary information, which is the main aim in our case.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach to generating explanations of790
why providers of services were considered to have more or less reputation than
other providers. This involved abstracting existing reputation assessment mod-
els into a generalised model that we used as a base to produce explanations.
In our work, we leveraged existing explanation approaches (for multi-attribute
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Figure 6: Analysis of the Impact of Explanation Length.
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decision models) to determining decisive arguments when choosing between op-795
tions, to account for the di↵erent values that are weighted in reputation as-
sessment, such as the weighting between a client’s own past experience and the
information it has gathered from its peers. We presented a model by which
concise arguments could be extracted from the reputation assessment process
and combined into explanations. Explanation arguments were evaluated with800
a user study. We concluded that, although explanations present a subset of
the information of trust scores, they are su cient to equally evaluate providers
recommended based on their trust score. Moreover, when explanation argu-
ments reveal implicit model information, they are less persuasive than scores.
Despite these positive aspects of our explanations, given that they are presented805
in a textual form, which requires more cognitive e↵ort to analyse, participants
showed preference for analysing scores instead of reading sentences.
For illustration, we have considered in this paper the FIRE and TRAVOS
reputation models. However, our approach is unchanged if an alternative reputa-
tion model is adopted, as long as it can be mapped to our generalised multi-term810
reputation model. We do not assume a particular representation of behaviour
or source of information, nor require a particular method of assessing reputation
from available sources. We identify the overall decisive criteria for a provider
being preferred to another, and subsequently identify the corresponding model-
specific arguments that support the assessment. The process of identifying the815
criteria and generating explanations is unchanged, but the details of the criteria
may be di↵erent, e.g. criteria for ReGreT [32, 3] might consider trust ascribed
to the groups to which agents belong, while for HABIT [7] the criteria would
refer to probabilistic estimations of future behaviour.
We currently focused on using and evaluating our approach with human820
users. However, automated negotiation environments can also potentially bene-
fit from our explanations. For example, when automated providers are selected
(or not selected) by clients, they can ask for explanations to help them im-
prove their services. In addition, explanations can be used by clients to improve
their choices by refining their preferences. Clients may also use explanations825
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to change their network neighbours. If a client observes that it always chooses
providers because they are better rated considering its own experience, even
though ratings given by peers are higher, the client may understand that its
ratings diverge from its peers, and possibly look for new neighbours. Moreover,
explanations may be used to share information among clients. For instance, a830
client concerned with privacy issues can state to other clients which provider is
better than another using an explanation as a rationale, without revealing their
preferences and ratings. All these di↵erent directions will be explored in our
future work.
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